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CURRENT DECISIONS
exclusionary rule3 7 and that any other result would permit unconsti-
tutional dragnet arrests simply for the purpose of holding a lineup.3
This decision is a logical extension of the rule promulgated in Wong
Sun and will not preclude the use of identification testimony resulting
from an arrest made in good faith which turns out to have been illegal
because of a lack of probable cause.39 Patently, exclusion of such evi-
dence would not serve the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule.40
The decision, however, will preclude the use of evidence secured by
an arrest for the very purpose of exhibiting a prisoner before the vic-
tim with the intent of having a resulting identification duplicated at trial.
Such an arrest is a violation of the fourth amendment,41 and the use
of the evidence derived from it is as much an exploitation of the "pri-
mary illegality" as where a defendant is arrested without probable
cause in the expectation that a search will yield evidence, and the
illegally seized evidence is introduced at trial.42
WOODRow TURNER, JR.
Evidence-PRIvILEED COMMuNICATIONS-ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVI-
LEGE IN STOCKHOLDERS' SUIT. Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093
(5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 39 U.S.L.W. 3411 (U.S. March 23, 1971).
Stockholders of the First American Life Insurance Company brought
a class action against the corporation and its officers alleging violations
of federal and state securities laws and common law fraud. The cor-
37. Id. The court, further, felt they would be required to exclude the testimony as
an exercise of their supervisory power. 432 F.2d at 585. See also Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 13 (1968); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J,
dissenting); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914).
38. 432 F.2d at 584 n.7, quoting from Broeder, Wong Sun v. United States: A Study
in Faith and Hope, 42 NEB. L. REv. 483, 535 (1963).
39. Id. at 584.
40. One commentator has suggested that the following question should be asked to
determine whether the exclusionary rule applies.
What goals do policemen have in mind in acting in this improper way?
What unexpected fruits . .. could or should be expected of the impropriety,
according to our experience? Is the exclusionary rule invoked in this case
calculated to deter such impropriety? Will, in fact, exclusion in this case
help to serve the policy ends of the rule?
Ruffin, Out On a Limb of the Poisonous Tree: The Tainted Witness, 15 U.C.L.A. L.
REv. 32, 38 (1967).
41. See note 5 supra.
42. 432 F.2d at 584.
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poraton's attorney was questioned concerning advice he had given the
corporation relevant to the matters in issue. The corporation (and the
attorney, himself 1) objected that the attorney-client privilege barred
the revelation of the substance of these communications. 2 These objec-
tions were overruled by the trial court.3 The Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit remanded for further proceedings, promulgating a
series of tests to be considered in determining the existence of the cor-
porate attorney-client privilege in a derivative suit.4
The question of when a corporation may invoke the attorney-client
privilege5 against its stockholders apparently had not been litigated
prior to Garner in a court of record in the United States.' While the
privilege has been viewed as a concept personal in nature,7 a corporation
has been held to be an entity capable of asserting it against strangers."
1. The appellate court noted that the objection was the client's to invoke; not the
attorney's. Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1096 n.7 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
39 U.SL,.W. 3411 (U.S. March 23, 1971).
2. Wigmore's statement of the attorney-client privilege:
Where legal advice of any kind is sought from a professional legal adviser
in his capacity as such, the communications relating to that purpose, made
in confidence by the client, are at his instance permanently protected from
disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, except the protection be
waived.
8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALs AT COMMON LAW § 2292 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
3. Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 280 F. Supp. 1018, 1019 (N.D. Ala. 1968). Cases which
have followed the lower court ruling include: Dahlke v. Morrison, No. 69-497 (N.D.
Ala, Oct. 3, 1969); Fischer v. Wolfinbarger, Nos. 5911, 5919 (M.D. Tenn., Aug. 29,
1969); Fischer v. Wolfinbarger, 45 F.R.D. 510 (W.D. Ky. 1968).
4. 430 F.2d at 1104. See note 18 infra.,
5. There seems to be general acceptance of Wigmore's four fundamental conditions
necessary to establish a privilege against disclosure:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not
be disclosed. (2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full
and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties. (3) The
relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be
sedulously fostered. (4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the
disclosure of the communications must be.greater than the benefit thereby
gained for the correct disposal of litigation. . .' .In the privilege for com-
munications between attorney and client, for example, all four are present,
the only condition open to any dispute being the fourth.
8 J. WGMOE, supra note 2, § 2285.
6. See'Comment, The Atiorney-Client Privilege In Shareholders' Suits, 69 CoLuM.
L. REv. 309, 311 n.13 (1969).
7. See Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Americin Gas Ass'n., 320 F.2d 314 _(7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963). See also Simon, The Attorney-Client Privilege As Applied
To Corporations, 65 Y.E L. J. 953 (1956).
8. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Assn., 320 F.2d 314, 324 (7th Cir. 1963).
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Historically, courts have granted equitable relief in disputes between
stockholders and corporate directors on the basis of a trustee theory.0
Consistent with this approach, English cases have denied the corpora-
tion the right to assert a privilege against its stockholders on the grounds
that the fiduciary relationship existing between them was hostile to the
secrecy contemplated by the privilege."0 In stockholder suits against cor-
porations in this country, courts have dealt similarly with the certified
public accountant-client privilege which may in some respects be
analogous to the attorney-client privilege. In Pattie Lea Inc. v. Dist7ict
Court," a derivative action in which the corporate privilege in respect
to a certified public accountant was. denied, the court adopted the
English rule that a corporate entity acts only on behalf of its stock-
holders. The court commented that when the corporation hires an
accountant, it does so for the benefit of all of its stockholders.' 2
A traditional exception to the attorney-client privilege exists where
two persons have as joint clients employed the same attorney to act
for them; the attorney-client communications in such -a case are not
privileged inter sese.13 This exception is based upon the ground that
the common interest and employment forbids concealment of infor-
mation by either client from the other.' 4
The court in Garner was confronted with the existing state of the
law which made the presence or absence of the attorney-client privi-
lege depend upon the court's conception of the corporation-stock-
holder relationship. To regard this relationship as one of trustee-bene-
ficiary would require the destruction of the attorney-client privilege
of the corporate entity as against its stockholders.' 5 To deny the public
policy which dictates -that the corporate management must be free
9. See 12 WM. & M AYL.R av. 125 n.9 (1970)..
10. See, e.g., Dennis & Sons Ltd. v. West Norfolk Farmer's Manure & Chemical Co-
Operative Co, [1943] 1 Ch. 220 (CA. 1943); Gourand v. Edison Gower Bell Telephone
Co., 59 L.T.R. (ns.) 813 (Ch. 1888).
11. 161 Colo. 493, 423 P.2d 27 (1967).
12. Id.
13. 8 J. Wsir.oRE, supra note 2, § 2312; PRoPos Rur.Ls oF EvwENcE FOR THE UNITED
STATES DisraCr CouRTs AND MAGiSTRATES R. 5-03, 46 F.R.D. 161, 251 (1969).
14. 8 J. WiGMORE, supra note 2, § 2312.
.15. Had the court adopted the trustee theory-under the English rule, the privilege
would have been unavailable to the' corporation by reasoning analogous to that of the
court in Pattie Lea Inc. v. District Court, 161 Colo. 493, 423 P.2d 27 (1967).
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from undue harassment would be to deny reality.'" Garner avoided the
problem by refusing to categorize the relationship. 1
Apparently, the court has taken cognizance of the detached relation-
ship between today's large corporations and their multitude of share-
holders by refusing to adopt, without limitation, the trustee theory fol-
lowed by Pattie Lea in its application of the joint client exception. In
its place, Garner has provided a more flexible set of indicators to be
used, on a case by case basis, in determining whether or not a group of
stockholders is in sufficient privity to the corporation to justifiably
preclude the corporation from asserting the privilege against them.
Among the factors,'8 which the court will consider in determining the
presence of the privilege are: the nature of the claim, the characteris-
tics of the claimants, and the availability of other means of securing the
information.' 9
MICHAEL D. HORLICK
Torts-PROxIMATE CAUSE. Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel,-Cal. 3d-, 478
P.2d 465, 91 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1970).
In an action to recover from a motel owner for the unwitnessed
drownings of a father and son in the motel pool, plaintiffs alleged that
defendant's failure to comply with the statutory requirement that a
16. Cf. In re Prudence Bonds Corp., 76 F. Supp. 643 (E.D. N.Y. 1948). Part of the
managerial task is to seek counsel when desirable, and obviously, management prefers
that it confer with counsel without the risk of having the communication revealed at
the instance of one or more dissatisfied shareholders.
17. The court discussed the various theories concerning the corporation-stockholder
relationship but declined to adopt any of them.
18. The court's test emphasized the following factors:
[T]he bona fides of the shareholders; the nature of the shareholders' claim
and whether it is obviously colorable; the apparent necessity or desirability
of the shareholders having the information and the availability of it from
other sources; whether, if the shareholders' claim is of wrongful action by
the corporation, it is of action criminal, or illegal but not criminal, or of
doubtful legality; whether the communication related to past or prospective
actions; whether the communication is of advice concerning the litigation
itself; the extent to which the communication is identified versus the extent
to which the shareholders are blindly fishing; the risk of revelation of
trade secrets or other information in whose confidentiality the corporation
has an interest for independent reasons.
430 F.2d at 1104.
19. The only definite conclusion this court reached as to the lower court's holding
was that this case involved a federal question with ancillary state aspects. It was not
a diversity case. Consequently the law of the forum state, Alabama, was not binding.
Id. at 1098.
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